This article presents the case of a policy invention where various kinds of entrepreneurship and a window of opportunity played important roles. In 2008 the EU adopted a new Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) policy with an inventive funding instrument at its core: the NER 300 fund, based on revenues from the auctioning of emissions trading allowances. Thus far, the literature on policy entrepreneurs has focused more on success factors that enable particular persons to be especially influential than on the defining characteristics of entrepreneurship. We contribute to the literature on entrepreneurship and windows of opportunity by distinguishing two entrepreneurial techniques -framing and procedural engineering -and two categories of commitment -'tortoise' and carpe diem. We conclude that 'tortoises' who contributed to creating the broad and general climate policy window paved the way for issue-specific carpe diemers who promoted the more specific NER 300 policy invention. Furthermore, we distinguish and discuss four different entrepreneurship mechanisms that may influence policy invention processes.
Introduction 1
Very rarely are new policies or new policy elements invented. Policy invention is widely seen as an inherently disruptive process, resisted by defenders of the status quo (see Jordan and Huitema's review in this volume). In this contribution, we offer a nuanced understanding of policy invention, highlighting how entrepreneurship can contribute to policy invention. Such invention entails the development of something entirely new -but new ideas are always inspired by existing practices, never emerging de novo. We assess the development of an EU climate financing mechanism for Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and renewable energy, the 'NER 300' fund, a policy that was arguably both internally and externally inventive:
innovative compared to earlier EU policy and to the policies of main economic and political competitors.
Political science has a long history of attributing policy inventions to entrepreneurs (see Sheingate, 2003, p.188 ; also Huitema and Jordan, this volume) . The invention of NER 300 illustrates how entrepreneurship may facilitate, but not control, climate policy invention.
Back in 1984, John Kingdon argued that entrepreneurs who effectively used windows of opportunity had high impact on US federal policymaking (Kingdon, [1984] 2011). We explore how entrepreneurship can contribute to opening such windows, and how some actors perform entrepreneurship directed at exploiting policy windows successfully. Actors with differing motivations and commitments may perform entrepreneurship that contributes to policy invention: what we call deeply-committed tortoises may help to create and shape a policy window, whereas carpe-diemers, with shallower commitment and a more short-term To increase acceptance for CCS funding, also renewable energy was included when the EU created the NER funding mechanism (Boasson and Wettestad, 2012) . Somewhat paradoxically, the mechanism has proven far more important for renewables than for CCS: in the first of two financing rounds, only renewables projects were financed.
In the next section we present our analytical approach as regards the focused role of entrepreneurs, and outline our methodological approach. Section three discusses the main characteristics of the policy output to be explained here. Section four offers a brief chronological overview of the fascinating story of how NER 300 was invented and adopted.
In section five, we discuss how entrepreneurship shaped the case and its outcome, and present conclusions of relevance to the literature on policy invention and policy entrepreneurship.
2 CCS consists of a suite of technological processes that involve capturing carbon dioxide from the gases discarded by industry, and then transporting and injecting the CO2 into geological formations (European Commission, 2008a) .
Exploring entrepreneurship and windows of opportunity: conceptual approach and method
Many political scientists have drawn attention to how entrepreneurs influence policy development and policy invention. Entrepreneurs have been seen as actors 'essential to the process of policy making' (Roberts and King 1991, p.147) , 'central figures to the drama' (Kingdon, 1984, p.189) , 'individuals who change the direction and flow of politics' (Schneider and Teske, 1992, p.737) , 'change agents' (Huitema and Meijerink, 2010) 'who specialise in identifying problems and finding solutions ' (Polsby, 1984, p.171) or who 'aim to induce authoritative decisions that would not otherwise occur' (Moravcsik, 1999:271) .
Kingdon further describes entrepreneurs as 'advocates who are willing to invest their resources -time, energy, reputation, money-to promote a position in return for anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive, or solidary benefits' (Kingdon, [1984 (Kingdon, [ ] 2011 . All these statements and observations direct attention to actors who engage to a greater extent, or in other ways, than required by their formal roles.
On this backdrop, policymakers and lobbyists who merely perform their regular tasks cannot be regarded as performing 'entrepreneurship'. For instance, a politician who adheres strictly to the party programme and acts within the formal rules that regulate a policy processes is not performing entrepreneurship. True, actors who try to follow formal rules may over time unconsciously contribute to changing the rules and hence contribute to policy invention -however, this is the result not of entrepreneurship, but of path-dependent developments or other mechanisms.
'Windows of opportunity' is a concept closely related to entrepreneurship, and central for understanding how entrepreneurs can play into policy invention. Such windows give entrepreneurs excellent opportunities for articulating and introducing new policy ideas into the legislative process (see Kingdon, [1984] 2011; Mintrom, 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink, 6 1998) . According to Kingdon ([1984] 2011), entrepreneurs will constantly be shopping around in search of decision possibilities where they can succeed in getting their policy ideas on the agenda, and will skilfully exploit any windows of opportunity. He defined a 'policy window' as an opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to attract attention to their special problems ([1984] 2011:165).
Kingdon employed the striking image of 'surfers waiting for the big wave' ([1984] 2011, p. 165, see also p.181), implying a rather passive view ('waiting') concerning the opening of policy windows. In line with Huitema and Meierink (2010) , we argue that entrepreneurship can contribute to opening as well as exploiting policy windows. Although
Kingdon saw windows as created by factors beyond the control of entrepreneurs, he also pointed out that 'the window exists in the perceptions of the participants' (Kingdon, [1984] 2011:171).
Rather than trying to identify the individual characteristics of entrepreneurs, we will focus on acts of entrepreneurship. After all, an actor may perform entrepreneurial acts in some policy processes and not in others. Here we are especially interested in exploring how entrepreneurship can contribute to the creation and exploitation of 'windows of opportunity', and focus on two dimensions: entrepreneurial techniques and entrepreneurial commitments.
Let us first discuss the techniques. Many political scientists have studied entrepreneurship aimed at overcoming barriers in specific decisionmaking situations, such as lack of formal access to decisionmaking arenas or to information as to when, how and where issues are to be resolved. Scholars specializing in studies of networks and multi-level governance have argued that this can be overcome by initiating new networks or alliances (Hooghe and Marks 2001; Roberts and King 1991; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith,1993 ).
Scholars of bargaining as well as students of EU policy have shown that strategic issuecouplings or other creative ways of changing decisionmaking procedures can be effective (see 7 Moravcsik, 1993 7 Moravcsik, , 1998 Sebenius, 1984 Sebenius, , 2009 Niemann, 2006) . We will understand these kinds of acts as 'procedural engineering'. By this we mean entrepreneurship that seeks to alter the distribution of authority and information concerning the political issue in question, for instance through networking, bargaining techniques, issue-coupling and initiating new decisionmaking procedures. In short, procedural engineering entrepreneurship is directed at changing 'the rules of the game'.
In other instances, actors may find that the policy in which they are interested is based on norms, values or world views that they consider inappropriate or malfunctioning. Then the problem, as seen by the entrepreneur, will not so much be that the decisionmakers do not have adequate information, but that they systematically interpret this information in the wrong way.
In such instances, actors may try to persuade others to change their preferences. Indeed, Goodin and colleagues argue that 'policy making is mostly a matter of persuasion' (see Goodin, Rein and Moran 2006:5) . We refer to such persuasion efforts as 'framing', using the term in a rather narrow way: we focus on new ways of defining, presenting, identifying and labelling certain problems, solutions, decision alternatives and decisionmaking situations (see Goffmann, 1974; Tversky and Kahneman 1980; Snow and Benford, 1988) . We assume that both techniques may play a part in creating and exploiting policy windows.
Turning to entrepreneurial commitment, the classic view promoted by Kingdon is that 'successful entrepreneurs are persistent'; they 'lie in wait in and around government with their solutions at hand, waiting for problems to float by to which they can attach their solutions' (Kingdon, [1984 (Kingdon, [ ] 2011 . In contrast, Fligstein has put forward the view that, in order to create large networks, entrepreneurs must possess significant flexibility, and even be willing to adjust their political project and shift their targets (Fligstein and Mara-Drita, 1996; Fligstein, 1997 Here we highlight the entrepreneurial aspects of the NER 300 case: we have discussed the social mechanisms involved at greater length elsewhere (see Boasson and Wettestad, 2013) . Compared with other EU climate policy cases, entrepreneurship stands out as a key ingredient in the story about NER 300. That is not to say that entrepreneurship will always be as important as it was with the NER 300 case, quite the converse: we regard this as an extreme case, where entrepreneurship is easier to trace and to assess than is usually the case in issue areas that attracting many participants.
The NER 300 case illustrates how various kinds of entrepreneurship may interact and contribute to shape policy invention. Thus it provides a sound empirical backdrop for developing new conceptualizations of entrepreneurship. In this study, we combine deductive and inductive research strategies: we started out with some standard concepts from the literature but came to realize that new conceptualizations were needed in order to develop a more nuanced understanding of how entrepreneurship may play into policy invention.
The new EU CCS policy and its funding model
In March 2007, the European Council adopted the goal of having 'up to 12' CCS demonstration plants in operation by 2015 (Council, 2007 (Boasson and Wettestad, 2013) . As noted by one Commission insider, 'we had analogies, but no model to build upon' (interviews in Brussels, January 2011).
NER funding works through a four-stage process: 1) the EIB sells the allowances set aside for the fund; 2) member states nominate CCS and renewable energy projects that fit certain technology categories (the Commission called for pre-combustion, post-combustion and oxyfuel CCS projects); 3) the EIB assesses the proposals submitted by member states against a set of eligibility criteria; and 4) after consulting with member states, the Commission adopts award decisions (Commission, 2010). The first process was finalized in 2012; the second process is now under way. However, all nominated CCS projects were withdrawnmainly due to lack of domestic commitment and resources -so only renewable energy projects were awarded funding in 2012 (Reuters Planetark, 2012) .
There are precedents for technology funding in the EU, particularly through the R&D policy (for a recent relevant overview, see Ruester et al. 2014 (Wettestad and Løchen, 2013) .
But the key element of the CCS funding model seems unique: its link to ETS auctioning revenues.
Taking a more global perspective, we can further specify the inventiveness -and indeed the possible pioneering quality -of the EU approach. Compared to the USA's CCS approach, with the FutureGen Program as the initial flagship (Stephens, 2009) , the EU approach stands out as more complex. This pertains particularly to the combination of carbon pricing through the ETS, with the funds available to CCS depending on the allowance price, and the formulation of more specific targets and timetables. Analysts claim that CCS in the USA is now driven mainly by economic concerns for enhanced oil recovery not climate politics (Hunton and Williams, 2012) . Still, there is some funding available for demonstration projects (Global CCS Institute, 2011) .
However, direct comparison between the size of funding in the EU and in the USA is difficult, partly due to the EU link to a volatile carbon market. As has become clear, the NER funding of CCS will be far more moderate than initially envisaged. But one thing is certain: the USA's CCS funding is not in any way situated within a broader climate policy framework similar to that in the EU. Nor do there appear to be any other major climate policy actors on the global scene with a CCS policy approach similar to that of the EU. Interestingly, central
Commission officials have referred to NER 300 as a model that can be used also in other areas (see Delbeke 2013) .
The EU CCS story:
From 'Nerdy' Issue to 'Name of the Game'
1997-2004: CCS emerges as possible EU climate-policy solution
NER 300 is closely linked to the history of CCS in Europe. This technology has a prehistory that dates back to the 1970s, but, unlike carbon taxation and pricing, or renewable energy and energy efficiency, it was not debated as a possible climate-policy solution in the first wave of EU climate policy initiatives in the 1990s (Boasson and Wettestad, 2013 (Boasson et al., 2009) . CCS was an issue mainly for the R&D departments, and was discussed 13 primarily in relation to petroleum exploration and processing, not as a way of mitigating emissions from stationary energy production. As for environmental organizations, Greenpeace was opposed to CCS; with the exception of Norway's Bellona Foundation 3 , no environmental organizations actively supported the development of an EU policy on CCS.
On the whole, the governments of EU member states saw CCS as an R&D issue, not one of policy. Germany, the Netherlands and the UK initiated CCS research initiatives, (Meadowcroft and Langhelle, 2009; Praetorius and von Stechow, 2009, pp. 139, 146-147; Scrase and Watson, 2009; Vergragt, 2009 ), but elsewhere in the EU, CCS was basically a non-issue (Buhr and Hansson, 2011; Costa, 2011; Jankowska, 2011 (Coninck and Bäckstrand, 2011, p. 371) .
Also the International Energy Agency became involved, hosting CCS conferences and issuing several CCS reports. Moreover, the USA emerged as a firm proponent of CCS (Helm, 2009; Stephens, 2009; Coninck and Bäckstrand, 2011) . The George W. Bush administration launched a CCS project -FutureGen, aimed at constructing the world's first large-scale zeroemission coal-fired power plant. However, as noted by one EU official we interviewed, 'CCS had a credibility problem (…) The Bush initiatives were more negative than positive for the EU process, because the environmental camp was against everything that Bush was for.' CCS was emerging as a possible climate-policy issue, but not much pointed towards the development of an EU funding mechanism. Neither can we find much entrepreneurship in this direction.
2005-2010: Climate hype underpins CCS entrepreneurial action
A window of opportunity for climate issues -including CCS -was created at the start of this The UK now took a more proactive position. Political consensus had emerged concerning national governmental funding of CCS. However, we do not find a similar rise in CCS interest in other member states, although the issue of on-shore storage had spurred some controversy in Germany.
In Council. The rationale was that the EU needed to finalize its internal climate policy quickly, in order to maintain its leadership position in the run-up to and at the Copenhagen climate summit in 2009. As decisions in the European Council are made by unanimity (due to its traditional role as the venue for 'history-making decisions' in the EU), this had important implications for the whole decisionmaking dynamic (Peterson, 1995; McCormick, 1999, p.16) . Instead of the full co-decision procedure (see Haigh, 2011) , trialogue talks involving the Commission, the Parliament and the Council were to sort out any main disagreements in a more rapid, single round.
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At this stage, the UK-based environmental investment management firm Climate
Change Capital proposed that a certain number of allowances should be set aside from the New Entrance Reserve in the ETS, and the auctioning revenues be used to finance CCS pilot projects (Hampton, 2008 (Bellona, 2008) .
The growing number of participants in ZEP made it harder to develop common positions. Most importantly, our interviewees point out that utilities were reluctant as regards promoting CCS funding, whereas the oil corporations supported a more active approach. Most member states remained silent, without any strong positions on CCS. As one interviewee put it: 'CCS was really such a small thing; few actors paid much attention to it.
Mixed feelings as to CCS lingered on in the
Many of the other issues in the climate package required much more attention.' Member-state interviewees as well as EU officials note that the UK was the most outspoken proponent of a CCS financial mechanism. In 2008, this was the main negotiating point of the British government in deliberations on the climate package. At this stage, the German Prime Minister
Merkel was definitely pro, whereas her environment minister was sceptical. Still, a joint statement from the German ministries of the environment, economics and research in September 2007 had characterized CCS deployment as 'necessary and possible' (Praetorius and von Stechow, 2009, p.147) .
In order to get support from a broader group of actors, CCS promoters introduced a link to renewable energy in the funding mechanism. This was especially important for gaining support from CCS sceptics, and made some governments, like that of Spain, more supportive.
Initially, Eastern European member states, such as Poland, were rather sceptical, especially because they did not want funding to be taken from the ETS New Entrants Reserve.
Eventually Poland became more positive -and our interviewees indicate that this change 21 resulted from targeted lobbying that managed to convince Poland that it would be able to get CCS and renewable funding from the financial mechanism. EU officials and civil society interviewees give vivid descriptions of the dramatic lastminute negotiations. These persons were not physically present in the room, but many had text message contact with the negotiating parties. Funding of CCS was one of the last unresolved issues. Discussions had begun with a proposal for 200 million allowances to CCS funding. No agreement seemed in sight, but the parties knew they would have to find a solution before the announced press conferences. At the very last minute, the British dug in their heels and obtained an increase in the number of allowances from 200 to 300 (Euractiv 2008b) . So the final figure ended up being 300 million allowances.
As that dramatic European Council meeting took place prior to the final plenary meeting in the Parliament, the latter found itself faced with having either to accept or to reject.
Here we should also recall that the two committees, and particularly the rapporteurs, had been heavily involved throughout the trialogue process (see Parliament, 2009, p.15) 
Discussion and conclusions
We have seen that several actors performed entrepreneurship in the policy process that led to the invention and adoption of the NER 300 fund. These entrepreneurs were loosely coordinated; they had differing commitments to CCS, applied differing techniques, and were active in creating as well as exploiting the window of opportunity. Initially, we distinguished between two entrepreneurial techniques: framing and procedural engineering -and two categories of commitment: tortoise and carpe diem. Our case study has identified a certain pattern when it comes to how the two dimensions of entrepreneurship may be combined. We propose distinguishing between four different entrepreneurship mechanisms (see Table 1 ). This is not to say that the Commission officials were able to re-frame the situation all by themselves. For instance, the competition between political leaders wanting to be seen as European climate champions also contributed to the creation of the window for climate policymaking. However, it seems clear that the entrepreneurship performed by Commission officials contributed to amplify the feeling of 'climate urgency' at this particular moment in time. They were 'climate tortoises', with a long-term commitment to the climate issue, seeking to persuade others that it was time to act and develop policies, pursuing the broader goal of an overall ambitious EU climate policy, to which they argued that the 'burying of carbon' could make an important contribution.
Second, the Commission officials together with the German and French presidencies performed Window Engineering: they altered the formal decisionmaking procedures in a way that boosted the capacity of the political system for efficient, multiple decisionmaking. By initiating these procedural changes, they contributed to create the window and increased the possibilities for policy invention at this specific moment in time. Indeed, interviewee information indicates that, in the CCS case, entrepreneurial success hinged on the special 24 procedure for finalization and adoption of the climate package. Also important was the fact that the ETS revision and the new CCS rules were to be determined simultaneously. These measures were increasingly developed as parts of the same package -the EU's climate and energy policy package. A procedural window created a foundation for the later CCS-related 'window exploitation' entrepreneurship.
By identifying two entrepreneurship mechanisms relating to window creation we hope to contribute to a new debate in policy entrepreneurship studies of how and to what extent entrepreneurship may influence the creation of policy windows. Kingdon's metaphor of entrepreneurs as 'surfers waiting for the perfect wave' has gained wide acceptance among political scientists (for an exception, however, see Huitema and Meijerink, 2010) . This idea gives the impression that the windows appear 'out of the blue', while potential entrepreneurs are just 'waiting'. However, the case of NER 300 has shown how entrepreneurs may deliberately create policy windows. Moreover, it indicates that a policy window will become more important and lead to more inventive policy decisions if window identification is coupled with window engineering.
Third, we note that Carpe Diem actors rushed in after the window was created, seeking to exploit it as much as possible. They performed Agenda-setting, trying to ensure that a CCS was framed as relevant to policy window and as a solution needed to solve the climate challenge. Agenda-setting has already been given considerable scholarly attention as an entrepreneurship mechanism. It is widely acknowledged that entrepreneurship plays important roles in articulating and introducing new policy ideas into the legislative process (see e.g. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Mintrom 1997) . Also Kingdon (1984) emphasizes that whether and when a political problem becomes coupled with a specific political solution will depend heavily on someone seizing the opportunity to suggest that authoritative, decisionmaking bodies should link them together. Note also that CCS lobbyists had a tactical 'stick-and-carrot' plan behind combining the two proposals: the emission performance standard was a negative 'stick' aimed at the polluting industries, intended to make it easier to muster support for the financial mechanism from green MEPs. The financing mechanism was then more of a 'carrot', rewarding large source polluters that invested in CCS. The entrepreneurs included renewables in their proposal in order to gain support from MEPs as well as member states, with Spain following up on this enthusiastically in the very final phase of climate-package negotiations.
Bargaining skills can have an impact on decisionmaking -that is not new to political science. What we argue is that focusing narrowly on the final NER 300 decisionmaking situation yields a skewed understanding of the importance of these tactics. It is only by taking into consideration the full range of entrepreneurship, including window creation and exploitation, framing and procedural engineering, that we can gain a broader understanding of how entrepreneurship may play into a policy invention process. This case has shown how policy invention may come about as a result of the entrepreneurship carried out by a range of different and loosely coupled actors.
The literature on policy entrepreneurship has focused more on success factors that enable particular persons to be especially influential, and less on the defining characteristics of entrepreneurship. In this contribution we have conceptualized two important dimensions of entrepreneurship (techniques and commitment) and proposed four different entrepreneurship mechanisms. It is our hope that this can lead to a more nuanced debate about what entrepreneurship is and how it plays into policymaking. Entrepreneurship has been our main theory focus here, but, again, we do not argue that entrepreneurship mechanisms alone can 27 give a full explanation to a certain policy invention. In order to grasp the bigger picture, also other more structural and cultural features need to be taken into account. Nor do we hold that all kinds of entrepreneurship will always be successful. However, by introducing more finegrained definitions of different kinds of entrepreneurial activities we hope to have made the way easier for future studies of failed entrepreneurship.
It should also be noted that the actors that influenced decisionmaking on NER through entrepreneurship have had little influence on the later policy implementation. The case of NER 300 clearly shows how a policy invention may serve another purpose than originally envisaged. Interestingly, to date NER 300 has funded only renewables projects and not a single CCS project, and, indeed, it seems set to remain more important for renewables than for CCS (Commission, 2013) .
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